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THEATRICALITY: A DRAMATIC FORM OF CONTESTING SPECTATORIAL CODES

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The objective of this article is to envisage the body in relation to the redefined notion of theatricality. I conceive of the body to be discursively constructed within a particular geo-political, cultural and economic context. The inscription of the body within the set of such relations is what I call the moment of representation. When representation is understood as the primary level in constructing the body, or any other objectivity, then we can say that it belongs to the order of performativity. This is to say that every representation is the expression of a plurality of dissimilar currents, both linguistic and extra-linguistic, in a single image, which can be articulated through various forms of visual and performing arts and everyday actions. The moment of confrontation between the spectator and the performed representation renders what I call theatricality. Theatricality is manifested through the tension or drama that challenges sedimented spectatorial codes: the ways spectators understand objects and forms of identity that are performed.

To perceive the body within the context of a dramatic structure of theatricality means to challenge prevailing theories that eliminate the moment of drama between the spectator and the performance. To justify this thesis, I take Erika Fischer-Lichte's theory of the body as a point of departure. I will acknowledge that '[t]he physical articulations which are seen, heard, smelled, or sensed by other spectators or actors ... generate perceptible behaviour patterns and actions' (2008: 153). However, I will criticize the possibility of conceptualizing the perceptible in terms of the 'sheer presence of the body or materiality' that Fischer-Lichte's theory proposes by introducing the notion of oscillation. A critical view on oscillation is the return of drama in performance studies. Once every performance is conceived in relation to drama, we cannot fail to recognize that the body is discursively constructed through the performative practice of representing and, consequently, that it provides a dramatic

moment of theatricality in relation to the spectator. The performing body mobilizes the spectator's physical and cognitive abilities, that is, both the mind and the body, to envisage different realities and contest dominant politics.

To unfold a view on theatricality in terms of drama, first, I will take a closer look at Fischer-Lichte's theory of perception (2008) that she envisaged in post-representational and pre-expressive terms, allowing for the perceptual experience of the sheer presence of the body or the being of an object. Drawing upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception (1947–8), which inspired Fischer-Lichte's theory, I will stress Merleau-Ponty's representational approach to the perceptual experience, which does away with the possibility of sheer presence. Further on, drawing upon semiotic phenomenologists Victor Rosenthal and Yves-Marie Visetti (2010), and Antonio Bondi and Francesco la Mantia (2015), I will demonstrate that every perceived form that is represented functions as an expression of the system constituted by languages and institutions. This view is in line with discourse analysis developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), which asserts that every social configuration is a result of linguistic and extralinguistic relations and hegemonic practices. Once our perceptual experience is envisaged within a theoretical framework that connects perceptual experience with languages, practices and institutions, then we cannot fail to notice that every sensorial experience is regulated by a hegemonic politics that controls institutions, social practices and collective representations. Consequently, it is only through a dramatic encounter with a hegemonic politics, rather than through the principle of oscillation, that performances may mobilize affects capable of invigorating democracy.

ERIKA FISHER-LICHTE: A POST-REPRESENTATIONAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

To perceive the body within the context of a dramatic structure of theatricality means to challenge

prevailing theories that eliminate the moment of drama or tension between the spectator and the performance. I particularly have in mind performance theory developed by Fischer-Lichte. Her view on theatricality, scrutinized in the book *The Semiotics of Theatre* (1992), has important consequences for understanding the body in performance that she developed twenty-five years later in the book *The Transformative Power of Performance* (2008). Her understanding of theatricality in semiotic terms, as signs of signs, signs that ‘double up’ a cultural system within which performance takes place, surprisingly, in her later work, brought about the understanding of the body in performance in terms of sheer presence of materiality, which does not convey the meaning, but rather evokes ‘a particular effect on its own terms and not as the result of its semiotic status’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 18). It is Fischer-Lichte’s belief in the possibility of grasping the sheer presence of the body or materiality through perception that places her understanding of theatricality as beyond representation and conflict, or, what I call, drama of positions. But, is this possible? Can we grasp the sheer presence of the material world, of the being of objects and subjects? Isn’t reality mediated by language? And, more importantly, does language produce knowledge about reality, or institutions and practices regulated by hegemonic politics? In order to answer these questions, let us take a closer look at Fischer-Lichte’s theory.

In *The Transformative Power of Performance*, Fischer-Lichte explains that in the performative event both performers and spectators are involved in the common situation of the here and now. When performers and spectators share the reality in such a way, that is, when they are both present at an event, as in a ritual, the relationship between subjects and objects, between observers and observed, and the relationship between materiality and semioticity, that is between signifier and signified, undergoes a drastic transformation.¹ Their relationships cease to be dichotomous and become oscillatory. In fact, it becomes impossible to make clear distinctions between these differential positions, between, for example, the artist-object and spectator-subject. By the same logic, it becomes impossible to make a clear distinction between the sheer presentness of the

phenomenal body of the actor and the presentness of the semiotic body of the fictional character.

Fischer-Lichte ascribes to the presence of the phenomenal body a purely performative quality, not an expressive one. She writes that the phenomenal body enables the actor to command both space and the audience's attention by mastering certain techniques and practices to which the spectators respond. In these processes, in which corporeality dominates, the materiality of a performer's actions do not dissolve into a sign, that is, they do not convey meaning. Rather, the performance evokes 'a particular effect on its own terms and not as the result of its semiotic status' (2008: 18). The effect thus evoked by the 'inexplicable' appearance of the actor's body, such as holding the breath, is not hence a consequence of the actor's interpretation of the text that builds a character; rather, it is the effect of the actor's individual corporeality, the sheer materiality of individual bodies, voices, pitch, gesture and the characteristic auras that embody being-in-the-world.

Drawing upon Eugenio Barba's distinction between the expressive and pre-expressive level of the artistic articulation, Fischer-Lichte emphasizes that the presence of the phenomenal body appears on the pre-expressive level. She explains pre-expressive as a break with ordinary physicality, such as starting movement in a direction opposite to the one aimed at, or introducing rhythmic body movements, or slow motion, or concurrence of impulse and reaction. The break with ordinary physicality 'enable[s] the performer to bring forth his body as energetic and thereby animate the spectator to experience themselves as energized' (18). Nevertheless, the specific energy that the spectator perceives through the performer's movement becomes, at a certain moment, symbolic. It is only at this point that the spectator creates the meaning generated by the sheer materiality of the performer's body.² Fischer-Lichte asserts that the switch of the spectator's focus from the materiality of the performer's phenomenal body to the semiotic body of the character is a result of perceptual multi-stability lying at the core of the performative event. She writes: 'While the acting and staging techniques ... repeatedly fix ... the attention on the performers' phenomenal bodies, the

dramaturgy allows the audience to focus on the character from time to time' (88).

Perceptual multi-stability points to the coexistence of two orders of perception. One refers to the perception of the phenomenal body, that is, the embodiment of an actor and their presence; another refers to the perception of the semiotic body, that is, the embodiment of a character and its representation. Whereas the order of presence generates meaning that triggers chains of association, the order of representation produces meaning that constitutes the character. And, whereas the former generates meanings as sensations and emotions that are articulated physically, the later stimulates thoughts, ideas and emotions that are articulated internally. Accordingly, meaning is not a matter of translation into words; it is the state of consciousness that triggers impulse for action. In this context, previously acquired meanings generate another perceptual process and influence what Fischer-Lichte calls 'the feedback loop's autopoiesis', which she explains in the following way: 'The physical articulations which are seen, heard, smelled, or sensed by other spectators or actors in turn generate perceptible behaviour patterns and actions in those who perceive them so forth' (153). The spectator is thus a participant in the performative event. By this, Fischer-Lichte concludes that the phenomenal body 'constitutes the existential ground for the coming into being of the character' (48); it is the co-condition for the spectator's perceptual shift and thus a co-instance of destabilization.

When the relationship between the phenomenal body and the semiotic body is envisaged in terms of correlation between the presentness of positions that possess the power to transform the spectator's perception – by generating meaning and stimulating action – then embodiment demonstrates 'the possibility for the body to function as the object, subject, material, and source of symbolic construction' (89). In this view, which has a tendency to overcome the dualism, concepts such as text and representation stand merely for 'the presentness of pretense' in real time and space.

In concluding this section about Fischer-Lichte's theory, which defines the aesthetic perception as a form of oscillation between the two orders of perception, phenomenal and semiotic, it is important to stress that in contrast to Hans-Thies Lehmann's theory, one of the leading advocates of presence above representation in theatre and performance studies in continental Europe, Fischer-Lichte argues that presence is not associated only with the consciousness of the spectator, but also with consciousness articulated through the body. When the definition of presence is accountable for both consciousness and the body, then it stands for the condition for overcoming body–mind dualism. Presence, Fischer-Lichte suggests, marks the occurrence of something extraordinary that develops into an event: it is 'the nature of man as embodied mind' (99). In other words, 'mind articulates itself through physicality' (99). When the ordinary is experienced as extraordinary it is then transformed and transfigured.

A REPRESENTATIONAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

Fischer-Lichte's theory of oscillation is largely inspired by Merleau-Ponty's work. Fischer-Lichte developed a theory of performance as an attempt to overcome the dualism between body and mind. She stresses the radical break with essentialism inherent in any form of dualism, by ascribing a post-representational approach to the perceptual experience, and by referring to the process of meaning-formation in terms of perceptual comprehension. This is how, in a manner of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Fischer-Lichte gives perception priority over the *Cogito*. Besides, her intention was to widen the terrain of phenomenology by applying an interdisciplinary method that bridges natural and cultural studies, that is, individual cognition and socio-cultural phenomena, or – to put it simply – perception and language. As a result, phenomenology ceases to relate perception exclusively as experiential activity stimulated by the sheer presence of objects, and, at once, begins to address semiotics and linguistics. And yet, by revisiting both Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology

and contemporary semiotic phenomenology, I will show that Fischer-Lichte's theory of perception is incompatible with either position, revealing theoretical shortcomings of her approach.

a) In *Phenomenology of Perception*, first published in French in 1945, Merleau-Ponty developed a view of the body that cannot be seen or touched as far as it sees or touches. He writes that the body 'is not one more among external objects' ([1945] 2003: 105). However, in *The Incarnate Subject*, published only a few years later, in 1947–8, Merleau-Ponty transformed this view. Thinking with and against the seventeenth-century French priest and cartesian philosopher Nicolas Malebranche, who saw the mind and the body as separate entities, Merleau-Ponty wrote: 'in order to have light, I must have a representative being facing me, otherwise my soul would be dispersed and at the mercy of its various states' ([1947-8] 2001: 50). What Merleau-Ponty's assertion implies is that the unity cannot be sought in the subject, but rather in the other that represents the being. He designates the other or the representative being, which is situated outside the subject, by intelligible extension. Once it is touched by intelligible extension, the soul, or the mind, becomes 'the fact of apperceiving'. According to this view, which disorients a subject-centred account, 'consciousness can only maintain relations of apperception with that which is not itself' (43).

What Merleau-Ponty's philosophy suggests is that the knowledge of the body is conditioned by perceptible phenomena, that is, by intelligible extension. In other words, the knowledge of the body (*res cogito*) is always constructed in relation to the intelligible other (*res extensa*). What the relational aspect of the body implies is that 'one's body consist[s] precisely in the fact that it is at the same time both mine and other' (44). Thus envisaged, the phenomenal body presupposes the schism or unity between a touching body and a body being touched, overcoming the Cartesian dualism between body and mind. The body starts to function both as the subject and the object; in other words, the body is always already represented and relationally constructed. As philosopher Martin C. Dillon noticed, such an approach to the body demonstrates Merleau-Ponty's attempt to

‘overthrow dualistic modes of thought in which the spheres of immanence and transcendence are seen as radically disjunct’ (1974: 144).

b) Linguists and phenomenologists Antonio Bondi and Francesco la Mantia suggest that ‘it is the semiotic practices that generate and organise [perceptual] experience’ (Bondi and la Mantia 2015: 13). Their assertion implies the three following assumptions:

- 1) in any subjective experience, perception is immediately semiotic;
- 2) the semiotic mediation of experience and perception is inseparable from the forms and values of which they are the object;
- 3) these forms and values can be conceived only within the social transactions that lead to existence. (Bondi and la Mantia 2015: 13)

These assumptions demonstrate that perceptual structures are both expressive and semiogenetic. Every perceived form always functions as an expression of some practical layout. In fact, every perceived form functions as an expression of the system constituted by languages and institutions. Hence, in the view of semiotic phenomenologists Victor Rosenthal and Yves-Marie Visetti, the expression of a sentient, of the one who perceives, is conceived ‘not as a completed act, but first and foremost in the expectation of the response of the other’ (Rosenthal and Visetti 2010: 55). This implies that human experience is valued in its individuality: it is a subjective and private experience. Yet, at the same time, it is a matter of a relation to some sort of exteriority, to historical, socio-cultural and political structures, that is, a matter of an encounter with the other. According to Bondi and la Mantia, any encounter with the other ‘can be seen as a socio-semiotic game that involves institutions (knowledge, transmission, norms, values and practices) and distributions of roles where the individual understands himself first as a semiotic perception’ (2015: 15). It is probably this that Rosenthal and Visetti had in mind when they wrote, five years earlier, that ‘the

subject is not a founding entity, but one that is required, led, by the requirements of the institution' (2010: 55). We can see how, by this method, semiotic phenomenology attempts to avoid the deadlock of the exclusivity of the immanence of the individual expression as well as the transcendence of the sole symbolic order.

Fischer-Lichte's intention to apply the complexity of this method, which aims at connecting phenomenology with semiotics, onto the body is obvious. The introduction of a bond between the phenomenal body and the semiotic body, between being and the subject, is a continuation of Merleau-Ponty's endeavour to overcome dualism. Fischer-Lichte achieves this goal by means of oscillation, the operation that does away with difference between the sheer presentness of the phenomenal body of the actor, and the presentness of the semiotic body of the fictional character. Therefore, unlike Merleau-Ponty's theory and semiotic phenomenology, in Fischer-Lichte's view the perceptual experience begins on the level of the sheer presence or presentness, rather than on the level of representation. Within this context, theatricality is a performative practice that elicits oscillation between being and the representation of that being, the latter amounting to, according to Fischer-Lichte, 'the presentness of pretense' in real time and space (2008: 97). Fischer-Lichte's belief in the possibilities of grasping the being of the body, that is the being in-itself, its presence, explains why she fails to recognize that languages, symbols, phenomena and signs are properties of institutions that govern various constructions of reality and that the primary level in constructing the body is representation.

POLITICS OF PERCEPTION

Fischer-Lichte's intention to link phenomenology and semiotics certainly provides an interesting starting point in an endeavour to resolve the mind-body dualism in performance philosophy in an

innovative way. She suggests that the body in an encounter with the semiotic other does not express, but rather performs, the possibilities of the body. However, problems with Fischer-Lichte's theoretical approach start here. She asserts that the phenomenal body appears at a pre-expressive level, as performative body energized by the performers' individualistic acts that do not convey the meaning, but evoke 'a particular effect on its own terms and not as the result of its semiotic status' (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 18). This is to say, a performance consists of individualistic acts that demonstrate internal reality, something that is simply true in-itself. However, the history of phenomenology shows us that an initial illusion of immediacy to the being always gets replaced by a semiotic phenomenon. This implies that the most essential possibility of the phenomenon is its semiotic construction, and that the sheer presence, presence in-itself, as philosopher Martin Heidegger wrote back in 1962, 'can by no means be ontologically clarified' ([1962] 2008: 106).

Abandoning a belief that phenomenology may enable an access to the sheer materiality of the body, we find ourselves in contact with recent theories of semiotic phenomenology that reconnect individualistic acts of constitution with expressivity. This operation is a way of acknowledging, following Bondi and la Mantia's understanding of expressivity, that performance appears as an expression of the system constituted by language and institutions.³ However, we cannot envisage the relationship between individualistic acts and expressivity as a socio-semiotic game that involves institutions (knowledge, transmission, norms, values and practices and so on) without taking into account the regulative power of institutions. If we overlook the significance of institutions in regulating identities and everyday practices, it becomes difficult to imagine how institutions can thereby be contested and transformed. It is for that matter that the transformative power of performance should not be sought only in the possibility of transforming individualistic acts enclosed within the field of immanence, as Fischer-Lichte's theory implies, but in the possibility of transforming institutions that regulate politics and social conventions within which particular human acts are hegemonized. It is only when institutional constraints are transformed that

alternative acts may be both conceived and performed. This task requires the process of contesting a hegemonic politics that have power over institutions from a counter-position.

Laclau writes that ‘without constructing a popular identity out of a plurality of democratic demands’ ‘[t]here is no hegemony’ (2005: 95). According to this view, the process of contesting a hegemonic politics requires the construction of a counter-hegemonic popular identity. This practice implies articulation of plurality of dissimilar and unsatisfied demands in an equivalential chain of popular demands. The popular identity is then the result of collective identifications that presuppose agreement in opinions, in shared forms of life: the way we use language, define terms and judge. Accordingly, identifications stand for the articulating principles of what Antonio Gramsci calls ‘popular wills’. Only when the unity is organized around an agreement on the way we use terms, the quantity of various wills becomes the quality of popular will.⁴ This implies that the struggle against a hegemonic politics cannot take the form of non-relational individualistic acts, but rather of acts that are connected in a collective. The collective consisting of different subordinated associations of people, which aim to win the consent of other groups and achieve a kind of ascendancy over them, stands for a concrete unity in a counter-hegemonic struggle that encompasses a different economic and political project, distinct from the one advocated by the hegemonic politics. Accordingly, it is on the collective to contest hegemonic institutions and rearticulate them in an alternative way.

The collective strategy of contesting hegemonic politics casts another light on our understanding of perceptual experience. First, it stresses that perceptual experience is not a matter of self-contained individual acts, but that it is relationally constructed. Merleau-Ponty’s later work is very explicit about this. Writing about the sense of touch in his posthumously published essay ‘The Intertwining’ (1968) he notes:

either my right hand really passes over to the rank of the touched, but then its hold on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not really touch it – my right hand touching. (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 148)

From this, it becomes evident that ‘passing over to the rank of the touched’ implies the other, a represented being that conditions the self. Once it is acknowledged that the acting subject (the one who is touching) and the subject acted upon (the one who is touched) are relationally constructed, it has to be recognized that the subject may never be grasped in-itself. It is precisely this that Fischer-Lichte’s approach overlooks: that perceptual experience does not stand for the abundance of individual, selforganized and autonomous acts that are only affectively expressed. On the contrary, perceptual experience stands for the shared experience, which is discursively constructed through the principle of identification with the other.

Information scientists Daniel Martínez-Ávila and Richard P. Smiraglia wrote that our perceptual experience is ‘constructed and transformed day-by-day by political discourse and strategies of control that affect the living experience of the people exposed to them’ (2013: 223). What one sees, hears, smells and touches is always already inscribed in the set of relations that bears the traits of hegemonic politics and conventions, producing effects necessary to maintain certain measures and rules. This means that our perceptual experience is collective experience controlled by power operated within that which philosopher Michel Foucault called institutional apparatus or *dispositif*: ‘a heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (1980: 194). Consequently, it is through the collective strategy of contesting hegemonic politics that our perceptual experience can be transformed.

When political logic is understood in relational and collective terms, it becomes apparent that our

perceptual experiences are conditioned by shared contexts, conventions, measures and rules, which are regulated by institutions, practices and representational norms. Such a view on perceptual experiences requires a detour from the semiotic approach to phenomenology concerned with the production of meaning, with the 'poetics' of language, to the discursive approach to phenomenology concerned with the effects and consequences of meaning that are regulated by dominant politics through languages, practices and institutions. According to this view, perceptual experience is discursively constructed by a politics that govern particular affects necessary for the reproduction of a hegemonic political order. From the point of view of performance studies, this is to say that in the current conjuncture, on the one hand, performance can mobilize affects among the audience leading towards the reproduction of demands for the capital, by complying with moral and economic laws of neoliberalism, and, on the other, that affects, mobilized by performance, may provide a terrain for a counter-hegemonic struggle, by contesting the capitalist techniques of production and domination, thus paving the way for alternative politics.⁵ Consequently, when the body is discursively constructed by hegemonic politics that govern particular affects, then a counter-hegemonic struggle against domination implies a possibility of investing different affects in performing bodies so that they elicit alternative forms of identification among the members of the audience.

If the practice of investing affects into bodies means to represent them on a symbolic level, as Laclau suggests (2005: 115–16), then every social unity stands for a collective constructed on the symbolic level. Recognizing, as Butler suggests, that 'actors are always already on the stage, within the terms of the performance' (1988: 526), we have to acknowledge that the perceptual experience of performance is based on acts that are always already symbolically constructed, that is, invested with affects. According to the view that envisages performances as properties of politics constructed through the practice of symbolization, neither perceptual experience stands for the sheer presence, nor performers' individualistic acts are meaningless, as Fischer-Lichte's theory suggests.

A DRAMATIC FORM OF CONTESTING SPECTATORIAL CODES

If theatricality is a performative practice of signs of signs, as Fischer-Lichte correctly observes, then our perceptual experience of performance cannot be envisaged in relation to the sheer presence of the body. A belief that individualistic acts of performing bodies may enable access to the sheer materiality of the body appears as the weakest point of this approach. It overlooks that the most essential possibility of the phenomenon is its discursive formation, thus missing the point that performing bodies are always already regulated by language, practices and institutions, and that our perceptual experience is governed by them. By foreclosing the recognition that every performance, just like every social practice, is regulated by institutions appropriated by hegemonic politics, Fischer-Lichte's post-representational approach to phenomenology renders performance theory unable to grasp the nature of 'the political' in inherently conflictual and agonistic terms.⁶ This is why the relationship between the performance and the audience may be conceived in terms of oscillation, as Fischer-Lichte's theory implies, only when that which is performed complies with hegemonic politics.

In order to contest hegemonic politics, we need to envisage the relationship between performance and the audience in an alternative way. Once we have acknowledged that our perceptual experience is a collective experience governed by hegemonic politics, through languages, practices and institutions, then we have to conceive the relationship between the audience and the performance in political terms as the encounter of conflict, tension or drama of positions. In this view, drama is not simply a matter of style, of an encounter between the differential symbolic positions tied to language (thought, speech, document and so forth) and motivational calculus or actions, as in Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism.⁷ Rather, drama is an encounter guided by the logic of

political formation. Far from manifesting through the operation of oscillation, a dramatic encounter enables the practice of contesting sedimented spectatorial codes: the ways spectators understand forms of representation that are performed and modes of identification that they impose. Such a dramatic moment of confrontation between the spectator and a performed representation is what I associate with theatricality. Theatricality implies that the body, discursively constructed through the performative practice of representing, enables a dramatic moment between the spectator and the performance to take place. In fact, the performing body mobilizes particular affects for the audience, thus employing the spectator's physical and cognitive abilities to envisage different realities, engage with hegemonic politics and contest them.

Finally, I would like to stress that the return of drama introduces a movement beyond the dualist thought that is gaining ground in performance studies. Unlike oscillation that deletes differences suggesting the possibility of a harmonious society, the moment of drama points out that human societies, just like social practices, including performance, may only be conceived as the effect of paradoxical and conflictual relations between differential discourses about society. This assertion implies that every representation, or every formal structure that is discursively constructed, including performance and theatricality, is at once the organizing principle of the mind and the ultimate reality of an object. Accordingly, the performing body may be perceived only at the level of representation, not in its essence.

Notes

1. Performative event in Fischer-Lichte's theory corresponds to the anthropological view on ritual as a performative event *a la* Richard Schechner. See Schechner (2003: 52-88).
2. In Fischer-Lichte's theory, the meaning is associative, not an interpretation; it emerges without intention; and it is linguistically inexplicable and unmotivated. Meanings appear as memories or new meanings; they are not based on inter-subjectivity. See Fischer-Lichte (2008: 143).
3. The meaning of expressivity in Bondi and La Mantia implies the other, a sort of exteriority, such as language, practices and institutions. As such, it differs from the meaning of expressivity proposed by performance scholar Bojana Cvejić, who connects it to Spinoza's notion of adequation, which implies the thing in-itself, without relational aspect. See Cvejić (2015).
4. On the notion of 'collective wills' see Gramsci (2007: 164).
5. I have distinguished complying from contesting artistic forces in Petrović Lotina (2017).
6. I understand agonism in Chantal Mouffe's terms as 'adversarial agonism'. See Mouffe (2005a, 2005b).
7. On dramatism see Burke (1969).

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